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Abstract
This paper experimentally examines why communication may matter for inducing cooper-
ation in strategic interactions involving intermediaries. We consider a three-player centipede
game in which the first and the third players do not interact sequentially, but only through the
second player. We posit that the third player’s decision to cooperate depends on his indirect
higher order belief, that is, his belief about what the first player believes the second player would
choose. The evidence demonstrates that communication between the first and the third player
can effectively induce cooperation from the third player through shaping his indirect higher
order belief.
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1 Introduction
Pioneered by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989), psychological game theory has become
increasingly important in explaining behavior in strategic interactions. The theory argues that
the motivations of decision makers, who may be influenced by psychological drivers such as guilt
aversion or reciprocity, depend on their beliefs about others’ behavior as well as the beliefs of
others. This theory has been shown to provide a powerful framework for understanding vari-
ous real-world phenomena in which individuals deviate from standard economic predictions.1 For
example, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) experimentally show that a particular form of commu-
nication, promises, effectively foster bilateral partnerships through influencing the players’ higher
order beliefs.
From a theoretical point of view, the belief structures that determine the players’ motivations in
psychological game theory become richer and more complex as the number of players in the game
increases (see Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009)): In a two-player game, a player’s action
depends on what he believes about the other player’s belief about his own action. We call this type
of beliefs the direct higher order beliefs. When there are three players, in addition to direct higher
order beliefs, a player’s action may also depend on his belief about another player’s belief about
the third player’s action. We call this type of beliefs the indirect higher order beliefs.
Indirect higher order beliefs may be important in strategic settings in which some parties do
not interact sequentially but through intermediaries.2 For example, in a company, a worker may
not interact directly with the CEO but only through supervisors. How a worker responds to the
CEO’s decision to appoint a supervisor depends on what he believes about the CEO’s purpose for
doing so (for example, the supervisor may either choose to help the worker to be more productive,
or monitor him more closely which increases his disutility). If the worker perceives the supervisor’s
action to be fully controlled by the CEO, then the worker can interpret the supervisor’s action to
be the CEO’s intention. However, if the supervisor has some autonomy, then the worker’s belief
1Important theoretical contributions to psychological game theory include Koplin (1992), Rabin (1993), Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009), Dufwenberg et al (2011) and Battigalli et al
(2014). See also general surveys by Dufwenberg (2008) and Attanasi and Nagel (2008). Experimental tests of this
theory include Gu¨th et al (1994), Berg et al (1995), Glaeser et al (2000), Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Hannan et
al (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002, 2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2011) and Bartling and Fischbacher
(2012).
2Intermediation is commonly observed in inter-firm interactions such as outsourcing (Hamman et al (2010), Coff-
man (2011)), in political activities such as bribery (Drugov et al (2014)), in workplace delegation tasks (Bartling and
Fischbacher (2012)).
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about the CEO’s belief about the supervisor’s action (an indirect higher order belief) may play a
greater role in affecting the worker’s response. In this case, direct communication between the CEO
and the worker may effectively shape the worker’s indirect higher order belief and help enhance
productivity in the workplace.
So far, the experimental literature on psychological game theory has only focused on examining
the impact of communication on behavior through influencing direct higher order beliefs in two
player games. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has examined how communication
may affect behavior through influencing indirect higher order beliefs in games with more than two
players. This paper serves as an attempt to address this issue.
We first present a simple model based on psychological game theory to flesh out how indirect
higher order beliefs can influence players’ behavior. We introduce a three-player centipede game
in which the first player interacts with the third player only through the second player. When
the first player considers his moves, he knows that the second player can either choose to hurt
the third player while benefiting both the first and second players, or to allow the third player to
make a decision. If the third player gets to make a decision, he can either choose a cooperation
outcome which generates high payoffs for the first two players; or to hurt them while benefiting
himself. The decision made by the third player may be influenced by his higher order beliefs. If
the third player chooses to benefit himself at the expense of the first player, he may experience
disutility if he believes that the first player had intended to achieve the cooperation outcome. In our
model, the third player’s belief about the first player’s expectation about the cooperation outcome
is not only captured by his belief about the first player’s belief about his probability of choosing
the cooperation outcome (i.e., his direct higher order belief), but more critically, by his belief
about the first player’s belief about the second player’s action (i.e., his indirect higher order belief).
Specifically, if the third player believes that the first player expects with high probability that the
second player is going to choose to hurt the third player, then the third player must believe that
the first player’s expectation of attaining the cooperation outcome is low. In this case, the third
player would experience less (or even no) disutility if he chooses to benefit himself at the expense
of the first player. Naturally, our model also allows the third player to suffer disutility from hurting
the second player if he believes that the second player believes that he will choose the cooperation
outcome.
Based on the insights from the model, we experimentally examine if communication can foster
cooperation in this three-player centipede game through indirect higher order beliefs. We begin
by allowing the first player to send a free-form message to the third player before the game starts.
3
We find that this indeed changes the indirect higher order belief of the third player and also the
frequency of cooperation outcomes, compared to the baseline treatment without communication.
We further use a treatment where the message that the first player could send to the third player was
predetermined and contained information about the first player’s belief about the second player’s
behavior. The rationale for this treatment is as follows: given that communication can affect beliefs,
a message that explicitly indicates the first player’s belief about the second player’s behavior would
shift the third player’s indirect higher order belief and the frequency of cooperation outcomes even
more. Our experimental results confirm this prediction.
This paper is also closely related to the experimental literature on delegation.3 The literature
suggests that the act of delegation may alter some parties’ perceptions about others in strategic
interactions. In particular, Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) study a game that shares some simi-
larities with ours, in which a dictator decides between a fair and an unfair allocation, or to delegate
the decision right to a delegee. The dictator’s and the delegee’s interests are aligned and they both
benefit from the unfair allocation. Two receivers are hurt by the unfair allocation and they can
punish the dictator and/or the delegee. The paper finds that punishment can be effectively shifted
to the delegee if the dictator delegates the decision right to the delegee and the delegee makes the
unfair choice. The authors also elicit indirect higher order beliefs (i.e., the receivers’ beliefs about
the dictator’s belief about the delegee’s choice) from the receivers and they argue that it is possible
that the action of delegation can effectively influence the receivers’ punishment decision through
influencing their indirect higher order beliefs. Our paper differs from Bartling and Fischbacher
(2012) in two ways: First, in the centipede game we study, the first player cannot shift the blame
to the second player through delegation and consequently avoid punishment. Hence, our game
captures situations where delegation is unable to influence the third player’s indirect higher belief.
Second, we show that communication between the first and the third player serves as an effective
way to foster cooperation through influencing the third player’s indirect higher order belief in such
situations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the three-player centipede game we
study. Section 3 presents a simple model based on psychological game theory that explains the role
of indirect higher order beliefs in influencing behavior. Section 4 experimentally investigates how
different forms of communication could affect the players’ beliefs and behavior. Section 5 concludes.
3See Hamman et al (2010), Coffman (2011), Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), Charness et al (2012), Lai and Lim
(2012) Erat (2013), Fehr et al (2013), Oexl and Grossman (2013), Bartling, Engl and Weber (2014), Bartling, Fehr
and Herz (2014) and Drugov et al (2014), among others.
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2 The Three-Player Centipede Game
Figure 1 presents the three-player centipede game we design to examine how indirect higher order
beliefs may affect behavior. This game captures situations in which two people do not interact
sequentially, but through an intermediary.
Figure 1: The Three-Player Centipede Game
In the game shown in Figure 1, all the three players have two actions: Left or Right. If Player
A chooses Left, all the three players receive payoffs of 5. If Player A chooses Right, then Player B
gets to choose between Left or Right. If Player B chooses Left, Player A gets 7, Player B gets 9
and Player C receives a negative payoff of -3. On the other hand, if Player B chooses Right, then
Player C can choose between Left or Right. If Player C chooses Left, both Players A and B get
11 each and Player C gets 9. If Player C chooses Right instead, he gets a higher payoff of 10, but
Player A gets only 2 and Player B gets only 7.
Under the self-interested assumption and applying backward induction, it is straightforward to
see that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is (Right, Left, Right) and the correspond-
ing equilibrium outcome is (7, 9, -3). Note that (Right, Right, Left) corresponds to the outcome
(11, 11, 9), which payoff dominates the SPE outcome. We call this outcome the Cooperation out-
come.
How might the players achieve the Cooperation outcome (supposing they wish to)? To answer
this, it is useful to examine the key features of the game: First, Player A cannot directly “coor-
dinate” with Player C on the Cooperation outcome by choosing Right. Whether he can do so is
also determined by Player B’s actions. Second, Player B can benefit himself while hurting Player
C significantly. Moreover, if Player A chooses Right, Player A also benefits from Player B’s action
that hurts Player C. Hence, whether Player A’s intent was to reach the Cooperation outcome or to
benefit himself while hurting Player C through Player B is ambiguous to Player C. This remains
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the case even when Player C observes Player B choosing Right. Third, If Player B chooses Right,
Player C can either achieve the Cooperation outcome or hurt both Players A and B, with Player
A being hurt more severely.
From this game, one can readily see that the key to achieving the Cooperation outcome hinges
on Player C’s belief about Player A’s intention. Then what might capture Player C’s belief about
Player A’s intention? Applying psychological game theory, we argue that Player C’s indirect higher
order belief, specifically, his belief about Player A’s belief about Player B’s action, plays a key role.
If Player C believes that Player A believes that Player B has a high probability of choosing Left,
then he believes that Player A’s intention in choosing Right is to reap higher payoffs at his expense.
Conversely, if Player C believes that Player A thinks that Player B has a high probability of choos-
ing Right, then he believes that Player A’s action of choosing Right is to reach the Cooperation
outcome. We now proceed to formalize this intuition.
3 A Simple Model Based on Psychological Game Theory
We present a simple model based on psychological game theory to illustrate how Player C’s indirect
higher order belief may affect his decision in the three-player centipede game above. To keep the
model simple, we assume that the disutility that Player C experiences when he hurts Players A
and B can be captured by guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)).4 It is important to
note that we do not claim that guilt aversion is the only psychological driving force behind Player
C’s action. The main focus of this paper is to examine how the indirect higher order beliefs affect
behavior. In Appendix A, we provide an alternative model that assumes that Player C exhibits
reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)) and show that our main insights do not change.
We begin by establishing a system of notations for describing beliefs in our model: Let δiC ∈ [0, 1]
denote player i’s belief about Player C choosing Left, i ∈ {A,B}. This is the first order belief that
a player assigns to Player C’s decision. A player can also form beliefs on the first order belief (with
certain probability measure). Let δijC ∈ [0, 1] denote the mean of player j ’s belief about player
i ’s belief about Player C choosing Left, i ∈ A,B, j ∈ {A,B,C}. This is the higher order belief
that a player assigns to Player C’s decision. Similarly, let τiB ∈ [0, 1] denote player i ’s belief about
4Guilt aversion is a well-established psychological driver of behavior. Studies in both social psychology (see
Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994, 1995)) and neuroscience (Chang, Smith, Dufwenberg and Sanfey (2011))
provide evidence of guilt aversion. Applications include Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2011), and Chen and Lim
(2013) who show that guilt aversion drives effort choices in team contests.
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Player B choosing Left, i ∈ {A,C}. This is the first order belief that a player assigns to Player B’s
decision. Let τjiB ∈ [0, 1] denote the mean of player j ’s belief about player i ’s belief about Player
B choosing Left, i ∈ {A,C}, j ∈ {A,B,C}. This is the higher order belief that a player assigns to
Player B’s decision.
Next, we differentiate between two types of higher order beliefs. The first type is the direct
higher order belief, which captures a player’s belief about another player’s belief about his own
action. In the context of our three-player game, the beliefs τBAB, δCBC and δCAC are examples
of direct higher order beliefs. The other type is the indirect higher order belief, which captures
a player’s belief about another player’s belief about a third player’s action. In this paper, our
primary interest is on Player C’s belief about Player A’s belief about Player B’s actions. The
formal notation for this indirect higher order belief is τCAB.
Consider Player C’s decision after both Players A and B chose Right. Choosing Right yields
Player C a higher material payoff (10 > 9), but he may experience guilt because this action reduces
the payoffs of Players A and B relative to what they expect to receive. Let θ denote Player C’s
degree of guilt aversion towards the other two players.
We begin by modeling the guilt aversion that Player C may feel towards Player B. Our logic is
similar to that in the two-player guilt aversion model in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006): Since
Player C gets to make a choice only if Player B chooses Right, his guilt aversion towards B would
simply be driven by how much he hurts Player B relative to how much Player B expects to get. In
our game, 4δCBC = 11δCBC + 7(1− δCBC)− 7 is the payoff loss that Player C believes that Player
B believes that she herself (Player B) would incur if he (Player C) chooses Right. Therefore, the
term θ × 4δCBC captures the psychological loss that Player C experiences towards Player B if he
chooses Right.
Next, we describe the guilt aversion that Player C may feel towards Player A. We assume that
Player C feels more guilty towards Player A the higher (1− τCAB) becomes. This is because when
the indirect higher order belief τCAB is high, Player C believes that Player A chose Left because
Player A intended to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, in which Player C is hurt
badly. On the contrary, when τCAB is low, Player C believes that Player A expects him to make
a decision. Moreover, it is also reasonable to assume that he thinks that the reason why Player A
chooses Right is that Player A believes that he is likely to choose Left (i.e. high δCAC). Hence, the
direct higher order belief δCAC may be inversely related to τCAB when τCAB is low.
The payoff loss Player C believes that Player A would incur when he chooses Right is: 11δCAC+
2(1 − δCAC) − 2 = 9δCAC . Therefore, θ × (1 − τCAB) × 9δCAC captures the psychological loss of
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Player C from hurting Player A when he chooses Right.
In summary, the utilities of Player C from choosing Left and Right are given by
UC(Left) = 9; (1)
UC(Right) = 10− θ(4δCBC − (1− τCAB)9δCAC). (2)
Given this, Player C chooses Left if
9 > 10− θ(4δCBC − (1− τCAB)9δCAC). (3)
When τCAB is low (so that δCAC should be high as well) and δCBC is high, i.e., Player C believes
that both Players A and B expect to reach the Cooperation outcome, Player C would also choose
Left.
Before we proceed to the lab experiments, we present two remarks regarding the model: First,
similar to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we do not model Player A’s and B’s decisions explicitly
and we do not employ equilibrium concept.5 This is because our primary focus is on how Player C’s
indirect higher order belief affects his decision. More importantly, given the unique structure of the
centipede game, Player C can only make a choice after both A and B have chosen Right. This means
that from Player C’s point of view, he does not observe variation in A and B’s choices. Hence, any
guilt he feels towards the other two players stems from his beliefs about the payoff discrepancies
between what the other two players had planned to achieve, and what they would actually receive.
These beliefs are independent of the modeling choice of Player A’s and B’s preferences, as well as
whether the players have common knowledge of others’ preferences.
Second, we allow Player A to send a message to Player C in the experiments. However, we
do not think it is necessary to explicitly model communication as a strategic choice of Player A.
Player C moves at the last stage of the centipede game. If communication indeed operates as a
strategic choice of Player A in the game, it is because of Player C’s belief-dependent utility, such
that communication can change Player C’s behavior through the changes it induces in his beliefs.6
5Note that Charness and Duwenberg (2006) simply assumes that the first mover in the two-player trust game is
self-interested.
6See Battigalli et al (2014) for a discussion on incorporating cheap talk into psychological game theory for a
2-person game.
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4 Experimental Tests
The model above illustrates the channel through which the indirect higher order belief τCAB may
affect Player C’s decision. Based on the insights of the model, we conduct a set of laboratory
experiments to investigate if communication induces cooperation in the three-player centipede game
through influencing τCAB.
The experiments were conducted with undergraduate students at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. There were 4 treatments, with each treatment consisting of either two or three sessions.
In each session, there were 18 subjects and 12 decision rounds (with 3 practice rounds before the
first round started). Each session lasted about one hour. In each round, subjects were randomly
and anonymously matched into 6 groups of 3 players each. After each round, subjects were re-
matched in the same manner by the computer program used to implement the experimental session.
We rotated the roles so that each subject had the opportunity to be Player A, B and C.7 Each
subject participated in only one session, and the average earnings were around $15.
4.1 Treatments
The main objective of the four treatments is to examine if communication changes Player C’s
indirect higher order belief, consequently affecting behavior and the game outcomes. The details
of the four treatments are as follows.
1. The first treatment T1 (2 sessions) was the baseline treatment where players did not
communicate with one another.
2. The second treatment T2 (2 sessions) is called the AtoC Free-Form Private Treatment. In
this treatment, Player A could send any message he wishes (or none at all) to Player C prior
to choosing Left or Right. All players knew that Player A could send a message to Player
C. However, information about whether Player A chose to send a message and the content
of the message were not revealed to Player B. In this way, the message was private only to
Players A and C.
3. The third treatment T3 (3 sessions) is called the AtoC Free-Form Public Treatment. This
treatment is similar to T2 with the following exception: After Player A’s message was sent, it
7Specifically, we rotated the roles so that each participant plays each of the three roles exactly 4 times. However,
we did not inform the participants that they would do so in the experimental instructions. In the statistical tests,
we adjust for potential within-subject correlation by clustering at the individual subject level.
9
would be shown on the screens of both Players B and C. In this way, the message was public
to all three players.
4. The fourth treatment (T4) (2 sessions) is called the AtoC Fixed Message Treatment, in
which the message that Player A could send to Player C was predetermined. In this treatment,
Player A can choose between two messages to send to Player C prior to choosing Left or Right.
– Message 1: I intend to choose RIGHT, because I believe that Player B will
choose RIGHT as well.
– Message 2: Blank message.
Once a message was sent, it would be shown to Player C. In this treatment, Player B could
not tell if Player A had sent the message or not, but he knew that Player A had these
communication options.
Note that the nature of communication in the experiment is “forward directed” in the sense that
the message is sent by one player to another player who moves after him. This feature contrasts
with experimental studies that employ “backward directed” communication (e.g. Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006, 2011), Lim and Ham (2014)), in which messages are sent by a player to the
one who moves before him (e.g., the sender can indicate to the player who moves before him that
he will take a certain action). One advantage of using “forward directed” communication is that
explanations such as belief-independent lying aversion (see Gneezy (2005) and Vanberg (2008)) by
Player C do not apply to our context.8
4.2 Experimental Procedure
The experimental procedure in every session is as follows: At the start of each round, subjects were
assigned their roles (Player A, B or C) and played the game shown in Figure 1. Each payoff point
in the game corresponded to 14 cents in monetary terms. After the subjects made their decisions
but before the results for the round were revealed, we elicited the beliefs of subjects. Specifically,
we measured τAB, δBC and τCAB from Players A, B, and C respectively.
9
8We note that there are some studies which show that “forward directed” communication may not effectively
induce cooperation (see Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Andreoni and Rao (2011)), because receivers may not
respond well to direct expectations imposed by senders. We do not find evidence for this in our experiments.
9In each round we asked each subject only one question about their beliefs to avoid introducing too much com-
plexity into the experiment.
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The first order beliefs τAB and δBC are not of critical importance, and they provide some useful
benchmarks for assessing how Player A and B behave according to their beliefs. Although we did
not incentivize the elicitation of these two beliefs, we have no reason to expect that the subjects
would report them untruthfully. On the other hand, since τCAB is the primary concern of the
experiment and due to the more complex nature of this belief, we incentivized the elicitation of
τCAB.
Eliciting τAB provides a basis for us to incentivize the elicitation of τCAB. In what follows, we
briefly explain the procedure of eliciting τAB first, then go through the elicitation of τCAB in detail.
Subjects in the role of Player A who had chosen Left were asked to guess the probability
(answered in percentage points) that Player B would have chosen Left had he (Player A) chosen
Right. Note that in this case, we asked Player A about his beliefs in a hypothetical scenario.
For the Player A who had chosen Right, he was asked to guess the probability that the Player B
matched in the same group had chosen Left.
The questions posed to subjects in the role of Player C were more intricate. Our goal was to
obtain a measure of the indirect higher order belief τCAB. Player Cs were told that the question
that will be asked of them depended on the choice made by the Player A that was matched with
them. If Player A had chosen Left, they were asked to guess Player A’s answer to the question
about Player B’s probability of choosing Left (in the hypothetical case that Player A had chosen
Right). If Player A had chosen Right, Player C was also asked to guess Player A’s answer about
the probability that Player B had chosen Left. To motivate the subjects in the role of Player C to
think carefully about these questions, they were awarded an extra 25 cents if their answers came
within 10 points of the actual guesses of the Player As (which were provided in percentage points)
who were in the same group. In the experiment, after reading the instruction to the subjects, we
gave verbal quizzes to make sure that the subjects understood all the belief elicitation questions
clearly, as well as the fact that only Player C’s questions were incentivized.
After subjects completed their guesses, the outcomes of the game for that round were shown on
the computer screens. Subjects who were Player C were also told whether their guesses fell within
10 points of the actual guesses of the Player As who were in the same group.
We chose above belief-elicitation protocol because it is simple and easy to describe in the
instruction. Our idea is to obtain a rough but meaningful estimate of the subjects’ beliefs (particular
τCAB) and we focus on examining the variations in these beliefs across treatments.
10
10A common concern in experimental literature involving belief elicitation is that elicitation of beliefs may induce
subjects from non-belief-based thinking towards belief-based thinking and subsequently change their choices (see
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4.3 Results of Baseline and Free-Form Communication Treatments (T1-T3)
4.3.1 Effect of Communication on Choices
Figures 2 and 3 display the proportion of Player A choosing Right, the proportion of Player B
choosing Right (given that Player A had chosen Right), the proportion of Player C choosing Left
(given that Players A and B had chosen Right) and the distribution of the game’s outcomes across
the baseline treatment (T1), the AtoC Free-Form Private Treatment (T2) and the AtoC Free-Form
Public Treatment (T3).
In the baseline treatment (T1), 131 of 144 (91%) Player As chose Right. Given this, 55 of 131
(42%) Player Bs chose Right, and this was followed by 24 of 55 (44%) Player Cs choosing Left.
The SPE outcome was the modal one, occurring 53% (76 of 144 groups) of the time, while the
Cooperation outcome occurred only 17% (24 of 144 groups) of the time.
Figure 2: Conditional Frequencies of Choices in T1, T2 and T3
In the AtoC Free-Form Private Treatment (T2), 134 of 144 (93%) Player As chose Right, 101
of 134 (75%) Player Bs chose Right conditional on Player A choosing Right, and 74 of 101 (73%)
Player Cs chose Left given that Players A and B chose Right. The SPE outcome now occurred only
23% (33 of 144 groups) of the time, while the incidence of the Cooperation outcome was 51% (74
of 144 groups). In the AtoC Free-Form Public Treatment (T3), 205 of 216 (95%) Player As chose
Right; given this, 160 of 205 (78%) Player Bs chose Right and 112 of 160 (70%) Player Cs chose
Left. The SPE outcome occurred 21% (45 of 216 groups) of the time, while the incidence of the
Cooperation outcome was 52% (112 of 216 groups).
Rutstrom and Wilcox (2009) for a discussion). Our study assumes that decision makers employ belief-based thinking
and investigates how communication influences the beliefs of decision makers.
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Figure 3: Proportions of Outcomes in T1, T2 and T3
From these results, one can readily observe that allowing Player A to communicate to Player
C reduced the proportion of the SPE prediction of (7, 9, -3) while increasing the proportion of the
Cooperation outcome of (11, 11, 9).
We now evaluate the statistical significance of the treatment effects on the players’ behavior
and the game outcomes. Recall again that each subject played the same role 4 times. We account
for this by clustering the observations at the subject level in our tests. Next, for each subject in
each role, we use a binary variable to determine whether they did the following: 1) Choose Left
more than 50% of time, or 2) choose Left less than or equal to 50% of time. Table 1 compares these
decisions across T1, T2 and T3 for Player B and Player C.
Table 1: Test for Effects of Communication on Player B’s and C’s Choices and Cooperation
Outcomes
The statistical tests in Table 1 demonstrate that the increase in the proportion of the Coop-
eration outcome in T2 and T3 compared to T1 is driven by the fact that Player Bs’ frequency of
choosing Right and Player Cs’ frequency of choosing Left increase in T2 and T3, compared to T1.
Note that we find no significant differences in the proportion of choices and the Cooperation
outcomes between the T2 and T3 treatments. One possible explanation would be that in T2, even
though Player B could not observe the message content sent by Player A to Player C, he knows
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that Player A could send a message that encouraged Player C to choose Left (and that both Players
A and C know this as well).11
4.3.2 Messages, Beliefs and Behavior
Figure 4 displays the means of the beliefs that we elicited (τAB, δBC and τCAB) across the three
treatments.
Figure 4: Beliefs of Players A, B and C
In T1, the average beliefs were τAB = 0.66, δBC = 0.33 and τCAB = 0.65. In T2, these were
τAB = 0.42, δBC = 0.57 and τCAB = 0.45, while they were τAB = 0.39, δBC = 0.58 and τCAB = 0.36
in T3. One can observe that compared to the baseline T1, τAB is lower and δBC is higher, and in
particular, τCAB is lower in T2 and T3 where communication was allowed.
Table 2: Tests for the Effect of Communication on Players’ Stated Beliefs
Next, we relate the beliefs and choices of Player C. From Tables 1 and 2, one can readily observe
the relationship between a lower indirect higher order belief τCAB and a higher incidence of Player
C choosing Left, as suggested by our model.
11This is likely given that each subject rotated among all three roles across the 12 decision rounds in the experimental
session.
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To better understand the effect of communication on players’ beliefs and behavior, we divide the
messages sent by Player A to Player C in T2 and T3 into two categories: “Cooperative” or ‘Non-
cooperative” messages. “Cooperative” messages include those that explicitly state one’s intention
to reach the Cooperation outcome, or those that directly request Player C to choose Left. The
remaining are classified as “Non-cooperative” messages.12 Table 3 shows some examples of the two
types of messages the participants sent in T2 and T3:
Table 3: Examples of Messages by Player A to Player C in T2 and T3
hi
hi
12We do not further classify the “Non-cooperative” messages due to the small sample sizes for these.
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Table 4: Tests for the Effect of Message Type on Cooperation Outcome
Table 4 shows that the Cooperation outcome of (11, 11, 9) was reached more frequently when
Player A sends a “Cooperative” message, compared to when the message was “Non-cooperative”,
in each of the two treatments.
Next, we investigate if the type of messages sent by Player A affects the beliefs of players in
T2 and T3. Table 5 shows that in T3, the mean τAB of those Player As who sent “Cooperative”
messages is significantly lower than that of those who sent “Non-cooperative” messages (0.36 versus
0.48, p < 0.01). Also, the mean τCAB of Player Cs who observed “Cooperative” messages is
significantly lower than that of those who saw “Non-cooperative” messages (0.34 versus 0.44, p <
0.01). In addition, the mean δBC of Player Bs who saw “Cooperative” messages is significantly
higher than when they saw “Non-cooperative” messages.
Table 5: Tests for the Effect of Message Type on Players’ Stated Beliefs
In T2, however, the differences across the different message types, for τAB and τCAB for Player
A and Player C, respectively, were not statistically significant. One plausible explanation for this
finding is as follows: Because Players A and C know that Player B cannot see the message content
in T2, there is no reason for them to expect Player B to change his behavior depending on the
message type. Note nevertheless that both τAB and τCAB are significantly lower in T2 compared
to T1, because Player B still knows that Player A can send a message to Player C.
Overall, the experimental results across T1-T3 confirm our prediction that Player C will choose
Left more frequently (leading to a higher incidence of the Cooperation outcome) as his indirect
16
higher order belief τCAB decreases.
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4.4 Results for the Fixed Message Treatment (T4)
We now turn to the results for the Fixed Message Treatment (T4) where Player A can send a
predetermined message to Player C. Recall that the message Player A can choose to send was “I
intend to choose Right, because I believe that Player B will choose Right as well.” Note that Player
B does not know if Player A chooses to send this message.14 Our rationale for this treatment is as
follows: By sending the message, Player A is directly communicating to Player C that his reason
for choosing Right is because his belief about the probability of B choosing Left, τAB, is low. If
Player C believes Player A’s message, then we would expect his stated indirect higher order belief
τCAB to be low as well. Therefore, one would expect the incidence of the Cooperation outcomes
to be higher in T4 than in the baseline treatment T1. Furthermore, because the predetermined
message directly manipulates the indirect higher belief τCAB, we also expect δBC to be higher and
τAB to be lower in T4 compared to the AtoC Free-Form Private Treatment (T2).
15
Table 6: Tests for Differences in Player B’s and C’s Choices and Cooperation outcomes between
T1, T2 and T4
In T4, 128 of 144 (89%) of Player As sent the fixed message to Player Cs. 139 of 144 (97%) of
Player As chose Right; conditional on this, 128 of 139 (92%) of Player Bs chose Right, and given
13As discussed in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), there may be a reverse causality between a player’s direct
higher order belief and his behavior due to a false consensus effect (Ross et al. 1977). For example, in the two-player
experiment of Charness and Dufwenberg’s (2006), Player B might think that other Players B’s will choose like him
and that Player A’s beliefs lean in this direction too (a false consensus effect). Hence, Player B’s belief about Player
A’s belief (about Players B’s behavior) merely resemble his own behavior. In our three-player centipede game, such a
problem is avoided because τCAB is not a direct higher order belief. Hence, τCAB does not reflect Player C’s behavior.
14We chose to keep the message choice private to Player B to avoid manipulating Player B’s beliefs δBC too strongly
(and similarly, so that the effect of δCBC on Player C’s behavior is not too strong).
15We compare T4 and T2 because they are both private treatments.
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this, 106 of 128 (83%) of Player Cs chose Left. The SPE outcome occurred only 8% (11 of 144
groups) of the time and the incidence of the Cooperation outcome was 74% (106 of 144 groups).
Table 6 shows that the increase in the proportion of Cooperation outcome in T4 compared to T1
and T2 is driven by the fact that player Bs’ frequency of choosing Right and Player Cs’ frequency
of choosing Left increase in T4 compared to T1 and T2.
Table 7: Tests for Differences in Players’ Stated Beliefs between T1, T2 and T4
Table 7 shows that τCAB is indeed significantly lower in T4 than in T1 and T2, which is
consistent with our prediction. In addition, τAB is lower in T4 than in T1 and T2. Finally, δBC is
higher in T4 than in T1. Although there was no statistical difference in δBC between T4 and T2,
the directional difference was as predicted.
5 Conclusion
We experimentally examine why communication may matter for inducing cooperation in a three-
player centipede game in which the first and the third players do not interact sequentially, but only
through the second player. We posit that the third player’s decision to help or hurt the first player
depends on his indirect higher order belief, that is, his belief about what the first player believes
the second player would choose. The evidence demonstrates that communication between the first
and the third player can effectively induce cooperation from the third player through shaping his
indirect higher order belief.
Indirect higher order beliefs can play an important role in contexts where some players do not
interact sequentially, but their actions have consequences on all players. This is especially true
in organizations such as bureaucracies and large corporations, where there are many hierarchies
or project teams. Hence, we believe that extending our current research to other multiple-player
games in which indirect higher order beliefs may matter and testing the role of communication in
these games would be a fruitful research agenda. For example, consider a game that starts with
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Player A choosing to let either Player B or Player C make the next move. The chosen player then
makes a decision that ends the game with payoffs for all three players. In this context, there could
be ambiguity of intentions because the chosen player (B or C) might not be sure about why Player
A had chosen him over the other player. Hence, the chosen player’s belief about Player A’s belief
about the other player’s behavior may affect his decision.
Appendix
A A Model of Sequential Reciprocity
In this Appendix, we investigate how the indirect higher order belief of Player C may affect his
behavior assuming that instead of guilt aversion, he is driven by reciprocity concerns. Following the
sequential reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we first define the following
functions:
pieAC = 1/2[5 + (−3τAB + (1− τAB)(9δAC + 10(1− δAC)))]; (4)
pieBC = 1/2(−3 + (9δBC + 10(1− δBC))); (5)
pieCA = 1/2(11 + 2) = 6.5; (6)
pieCB = 1/2(11 + 7) = 9. (7)
The function pieij can be regarded as a norm for player i that describes the “equitable” payoff
for player j given player i’s beliefs about the other players’ behavior. In other words, player
i’s kindness towards player j is zero if he believes that player j’s material payoff is the average
between the lowest and the highest material payoff of j. For Player A, given his belief τAB and
δAC , he knows that if he chooses Left, Player C gets 5, and if he chooses Right, Player C gets
−3τAB +(1−τAB)(9δAC +10(1−δAC)). Therefore, the average pieAC serves as a reference point that
measures Player A’s kindness towards C. For Player B, conditional on Player A choosing Right,
given his belief δBC , he knows that if he chooses Left, Player C gets −3, and if he chooses Right,
Player C gets 9δBC + 10(1 − δBC). Similarly, the average pieBC serves as a reference point that
measures Player B’s kindness towards C. For Player C, conditional on Players A and B choosing
Right, he knows that if he chooses Left, Players A and B both get 11, and if he chooses Right,
Players A and B get 2 and 7, respectively. Therefore, pieCA and pi
eC
B are the reference points that
measure Player C’s kindness towards A and B.
Given the “equitable” payoff functions, we can now define kindness. Since our focus in this
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paper is on Player C, we define only Player C’s kindness and his beliefs about Player A’s and B’s
kindness. Player C’s kindness towards Players A and B if he chooses Left is given by
kCA(L) = 11− pieCA = 4.5; (8)
kCB(L) = 11− pieCB = 2. (9)
The above measures how much Player C brings Players A and B if he chooses Left, compared
to the reference points. Player C’s belief about Player A’s kindness towards C if A chooses Right
is given by
λCAC(R) = −3τCAB + (1− τCAB)(9δCAC + 10(1− δCAC))− EC [pieAC ]
= −3τCAB + (1− τCAB)(9δCAC + 10(1− δCAC))
−1/2[5 + (−3τCAB + (1− τCAB)(9δCAC + 10(1− δCAC)))]
= 1/2[5− δCAC − τCAB(13− δCAC)]. (10)
The above captures how much Player C believes that Player A brings him if the latter chooses
Right, compared to his belief about Player A’s reference point. One can see that λCAC(R) is
decreasing in τCAB. In other words, as τCAB increases, Player C believes that Player A is less kind
towards him. Moreover, when τCAB is sufficiently large, λCAC(R) is negative, which means that
Player C believes that Player A is unkind to him.
Player C’s belief about Player B’s kindness towards him when B chooses Right is given by
λCBC(R) = 9δCBC + 10(1− δCBC)− EC [pieBC ]
= 9δCBC + 10(1− δCBC)− 1/2[−3 + 9δCBC + 10(1− δCBC)]
= 1/2(13− δCBC). (11)
The above measures how much Player C believes Player B brings him when B chooses Right,
compared to his belief about Player B’s reference point. One can see that λCBC(R) is always
positive, which implies that Player C always interpret B’s choice of Right as a kind action.
Given the definitions of Player C’s kindness and his beliefs about Player A’s and B’s kindness
towards him, we assume that Player C experiences additional utility from reciprocation if he chooses
Left. This extra utility is given by
YCA × kCA(L)× λCAC(R) + YCB × kCB(L)× λCBC(R)
= 2.25YCA × [5− δCAC − τCAB(13− δCAC)] + YCB × (13− δCBC), (12)
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where YCA and YCB are exogenous parameters that capture Player C’s sensitivity to reciprocity
concerns towards Players A and B, respectively. Note that Player C’s utility from reciprocating
Player B’s action is always positive, while Player C’s reciprocity utility towards A can be either
positive or negative. When this utility is negative, it means that Player C experiences disutility
from helping A when he believes that Player A is unkind to him. (Note that if we include this term
into Player C’s utility from choosing Right, it can be interpreted as a utility gain from reciprocating
Player A when he believes that A is unkind to him.)
In sum, the utilities of Player C from choosing Left and Right are given by
UC(Left) = 9 + 2.25YCA × [5− δCAC − τCAB(13− δCAC)] + YCB × (13− δCBC); (13)
UC(Right) = 10. (14)
Again in this model, the direct higher order belief δCAC may be inversely related to τCAB. If
Player C believes that Player A believes that Player B is likely to choose Right (i.e., low τCAB), it
is also reasonable to assume that Player C thinks Player A chooses Right because Player A believes
that Player C is likely to choose Left (i.e., high δCAC). Given this, Player C chooses Left if
9 + 2.25YCA × [5− δCAC − τCAB(13− δCAC)] + YCB × (13− δCBC) > 10. (15)
One can see that when τCAB is low enough (so that δCAC should be high as well) and δCBC is
high enough, i.e., when Player C believes that both Players A and B expect to reach the Cooperation
outcome, Player C would choose Left. Therefore, in the sequential reciprocity model, the indirect
higher order belief τCAB works in the same direction in affecting Player C’s behavior as in the guilt
aversion model.
B Instructions for the AtoC Free-Form Public Treatment (T3)
Instructions for Experimental Game
1. Introduction
This is an experiment in decision-making. The instructions are simple, if you follow them carefully
and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of cash that will be paid to you
immediately and privately after the experiment. The amount of cash you earn depends partly on
your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. Do not look at the decisions
of others, talk, laugh or engage in any activities unrelated to the experiment. You will be warned
if you violate this rule the first time. If you violate this rule twice, we will cancel the experiment
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immediately and your earnings will be $0.
The participants in this experiment will participate in a total of 12 decision rounds. At the
start of each round, you will be assigned to be either Player A, Player B or Player C. The roles
will be reassigned each round, which means that in each round you will play a different role. The
computer will also randomly and anonymously match the participants into groups such that there
is one Player A, one Player B and one Player C in each group. This matching process will be
repeated in every round. That is, you will be re-matched with another two players in every round
until all 12 rounds are completed.
All participants will play the Experimental Game for the entire 12 rounds. In the Experimental
Game, we will always begin with Player A’s decision, followed by Player B’s decision and then
by Player C’s decision. In each group, Player A can send a message to Player C at the start of
the game. This message will also be revealed to Player B. We will use a computer program to
coordinate the experiment. The specific decisions for each player are described below.
2. Moves and Decisions
Experimental Game:
Player A moves first:
• Player A sends a message to Player C. Player A can type whatever she wants to say to Player
C. Please type your message in the dialog box in 90 seconds.
• After the message is sent, both Player B and Player C can see the message sent by A.
• Player A chooses either LEFT or RIGHT.
• If Player A chooses LEFT, the game ends and Players A, B and C each receive 5 points.
If Player A chooses RIGHT, then Player B gets to make a decision:
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• Player B chooses either LEFT or RIGHT.
• If Player B chooses LEFT, the game ends and Player A receives 7 points, B receives 9 points
and C makes a loss of 3 points.
If Player B chooses RIGHT, then Player C gets to make a decision:
• Player C chooses either LEFT or RIGHT.
• If Player C chooses LEFT, Player A receives 11 points, B receives 11 points and C receives 9
points.
• If Player C chooses RIGHT, A receives 2 points, B receives 7 points and C receives 10 points.
3. Guessing what the other players will choose
After every round, depending on whether your role was that of Player A, Player B or Player C, we
ask that you answer the following questions. We ask that you answer the questions according to
what you believe to be true.
Question for Player A: The question you answer depends on whether you had chosen LEFT or
RIGHT.
*If you had chosen LEFT, please answer the following question:
I guess that if I had chosen RIGHT, there is a ( ) percent chance that Player B would have
chosen LEFT. (Fill in an integer from 0 to 100.)
*If you had chosen RIGHT, please answer the following question:
I guess that there is a ( ) percent chance that Player B has chosen LEFT. (Fill in an integer
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from 0 to 100.)
Question for Player B: You will be asked to answer a question ONLY if Player A has cho-
sen RIGHT. The question you answer also depends on whether you had chosen LEFT or RIGHT.
*If you had chosen LEFT, please answer the following question:
I guess that if I had chosen RIGHT, there is a ( ) percent chance that Player C would have
chosen LEFT. (Fill in an integer from 0 to 100.)
*If you had chosen RIGHT, please answer the following question:
I guess that there is a ( ) percent chance that Player C has chosen LEFT. (Fill in an integer
from 0 to 100.)
Questions for Player C: The question you answer depends on whether Player A had chosen
LEFT or RIGHT. You will receive payment for a correct answer.
*If Player A had chosen LEFT, your question is as follows:
Player A has chosen LEFT and has been asked to guess the probability (in percentage terms)
that Player B would have chosen LEFT.
My guess is that Player A’s GUESS is ( ) percent. (Fill in an integer from 0 to 100.)
*If Player A had chosen RIGHT, your question is as follows: Player A has chosen RIGHT and
has been asked to guess the probability (in percentage terms) that Player B has chosen LEFT.
My guess is that Player A’s GUESS is ( ) percent. (Fill in an integer from 0 to 100.)
Note: If your guess (of Player A’s guess) is within 10 percent of Player A’s actual guess, you
will receive 25 cents.
24
4. Cash Earnings
Your final earnings include the following two components:
1. Player C will be rewarded 25 cents for each correct guess.
2. You will earn also 14 cents ×(total payoffs in the 12 rounds). In other words, each point in the
Experimental Game is worth 14 cents.
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